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This thesis investigates how to design in different levels of autonomy to improve 
the resilience of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) by applying the Function-
specific Level of Autonomy Tool (FLOAAT) developed by NASA. This tool helps 
to define the levels of autonomy human-operators are comfortable with as well as 
assists designers in understanding how to design in that level of autonomy. The 
thesis begins by reviewing past literature about resilience in engineered systems, 
defining terms pertaining to autonomy, introduces the concept of adjustable 
autonomy, and reviews the development supervisory control levels that define 
adjustable autonomy. It broadens the research that NASA performed and applies 
the tool to UAS functions. The extension of this thesis would lead to a more 
unified approach to defining levels of autonomy that can be adjusted for control 
of autonomous systems, and the development of components of software 
architecture that lead to greater systems resilience through integration of the 
human-operator in a way that is trusted. This effort is intended to create a 
foundation for human-centered automation to accommodate human-operator 
trust properly. 
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In 2012, the Defense Science Board published a study on autonomy. This 
comprehensive look at autonomy and its employment in the DOD provided many 
areas of improvement, one being the interface between the operator and 
autonomous systems. According to the Defense Science Board’s 2012 Task 
Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, the interface between the 
unmanned system and operator is brittle; this brittleness was noted as a 
limitation preventing further adoption of autonomous systems (DSB, 2012). 
Brittleness, in this case, was where these autonomous systems, being too 
deterministic, were not able to adapt to situations that were different from 
anticipated. Designers are not able to anticipate fully all of the scenarios that 
could arise during the use of the system. Hence, the research focus on building a 
system that can react and adapt–to design and build in robustness to counteract 
the unintended brittleness, and to leverage the human-operator in the process. 
This thesis explores how to build in resiliency by providing the human-
operator different levels of control over an autonomous system–ranging from fully 
manual to fully autonomous. It does so by adapting the Function-specific Level of 
Autonomy Tool (FLOAAT) developed by NASA for application on a UAS. By 
properly defining and designing in to the system different levels of autonomy that 
the human-operator can select, it improves human-system interaction in a way 
that optimizes each the competencies of both the human operator and the 
system. 
In summary, FLOAAT proved to be an effective tool to get at the heart of 
what level of autonomy is appropriate for any one function. The approach forced 
thoughtful consideration of different design, employment and cost aspects of 
making a function autonomous, which, in a manner, forced thorough 
requirements analysis for that function. Employment of FLOAAT showed that the 
process for determining the Level of Autonomy for any one function is iterative; a 
subject matter expert, in working through the questions and rating level 
 xvi 
definitions wrestles with the derived level resulting from the tool, and, 
conceivable would negotiate the intent and meaning of this level with a broader 
systems design team. 
Though the tool has proven useful in initial research, further investigation 
is required to truly validate its employment in the UAS domain. NASA has applied 
this to several programs. In doing so, they have developed approaches to 
validate the level of autonomy as suggested by FLOAAT (Proud and Hart 2005). 
They have a baseline of experience to draw from. This is not the case for 
unmanned aerial systems. If this tool were to be more widely adopted, there is 
more work to be done: 
1. Determination of the composition of the team who should 
participate in the process of defining the level of autonomy by 
answering the questionnaire. How many and of why type of subject 
matter experts should be included?  
2. According to Proud and Hart, the Level of Autonomy tool employed 
and adapted was originally designed to ascertain the division of 
labor between the computer and the human-operator. Additional 
questions could be added to determine the division of labor 
between what should be on the aircraft and what functions should 
be executed in the mission control system. 
3. The questions should be refined and tested against a larger cross-
section of users or subject matter experts to ensure the question is 
clear and the intent is communicated. 
4. Test cases should be developed in order to more quickly validate 
the scores and even prototype the output. 
In conclusion, autonomous systems have been changing the way the 
military does business, and, with recent investment by the DOD and the 
commercial world, is on the threshold of exerting deep changes in military 
operations. These systems can and will be able to be operated without direct 
human control for extended periods of time and over long distances. This is 
beneficial and will open the field for more applications while reducing costs; but, it 
should be done with the human-operator and his/her strengths and weaknesses, 
in mind. Or else, the systems may not be adopted, or, even worse, the systems 
 xvii 
may not be safe. As such, the following are a few suggested areas of further 
research: 
1. Human-Operator Collaboration 
• Determine how the roles of human-operations and the autonomous 
systems, as well as the human-system interface, should evolve to 
enhance more efficient yet safe operations. 
• Further understanding of human psychology in the operation of 
autonomous systems. 
• Interfaces, be they visual, aural, focused on assistance or alerting 
to problems that improve human performance. 
• Approaches to adjust to different skill and cognition levels in 
human-operators, with an eye toward safety. 
2. Verification, Validation, and Certification 
• Develop standards and processes for the verification, validation, 
and certification of autonomous systems, and determine their 
implications for architecture and design. 
3. Autonomy Architecture 
• Explore and define the landscape of autonomous systems 
architecture to further the ability to adapt and verify and validate the 
system. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
This thesis examines an approach to improve the resilience of 
autonomous systems using adjustable autonomy and namely focuses on an 
unmanned aerial system. It leverages a framework the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) has employed in its space systems to enhance 
autonomy (Proud and Hart, 2005) while ensuring the trust of the operator. In 
doing so, the method developed provides a means to design in levels of 
autonomy that engenders the trust of a human-operator and that provides a 
means to improve the resiliency of autonomous systems. 
The motivation for this focus came from the examination of the Defense 
Science Board’s (DSB) report on autonomy completed in 2012 (Defense Science 
Board [DSB] 2012). This comprehensive look at autonomy and its employment in 
the DOD identified many areas of improvement, one being the interface between 
the operator and autonomous systems. The interface between the unmanned 
system and operator was characterized as brittle; this brittleness was noted as a 
limitation preventing further adoption of autonomous systems (DSB 2012). 
Brittleness, pointed out in the DSB report, was where these autonomous 
systems, by being too deterministic, were not able to adapt to situations that 
were different than anticipated when the software was originally developed. In 
essence, this brittleness is the opposite of resiliency. Resiliency is the ability to 
adapt to changing conditions (natural or man-made) through planning on how to 
absorb (withstand) and rapidly recover from adverse events and disruptions 
(Vaneman and Triantis 2014). 
Brittleness can arise because of the inability to anticipate and design for 
all of the scenarios that could arise during the use of the system (Duda and 
Shortliffe 1983). While this definition covers system operations in predictable 
environments, it breaks down in the context of uncertainty (Lenat and Guha 
1989). Failure modes cannot be exhaustively anticipated; designers already are 
challenged to think through as many scenarios as possible. Hence, the focus on 
 2 
building a system that can react and adapt—to design and build in robustness to 
counteract the unintended brittleness. 
An approach to engineering resilience into a system is to leverage the 
capabilities of the human operator. Humans may not be able to land a plane in a 
predefined precise location as well as a computer can, but humans can adeptly 
and much more effectively anticipate issues or unforeseen events and adjust 
their response toward mission achievement. To be effective, autonomous 
systems need to be competent collaborators with human-operators. Critical 
analysis to define the appropriate functional allocation of the roles between the 
system and human, and level of automation to those functions, are essential. A 
compromise has to be found between completely manual and fully autonomous 
operations. This is where adjustable autonomy comes in, where control is 
provided to the human-operator to enable a level of autonomy with which the 
operator is comfortable. Such interaction allows the dynamic adjustment of 
autonomy to face whatever situation or environment exists at that time (Zieba et 
al. 2009). 
This thesis leverages a tool developed by NASA that assists with 
determining what level of autonomy to design, function by function, into a system. 
The approach involved adapting the Function-specific Level of Autonomy and 
Automation Tool (FLOAAT), by considering supervisory-control principles 
developed for air systems and architectural attributes for resilient systems as 
defined by Vaneman and Triantis (Vaneman and Triantis, 2014).  Chapter II 
provides the background and summarizes research pertinent to the domains of 
engineering resilience into a system, autonomy and supervisory control. Chapter 
III breaks down NASA’s approach to adjustable autonomy and illustrates how the 
tool was adapted and why. Chapter IV summarizes and presents the application 
of NASA’s FLOAAT to an unmanned aerial system. Chapter V then reviews and 
summarizes conclusions, discusses lessons learned, and suggests research that 
is required to advance the domain.  Included are two appendices: Appendix A, 
which provides details of the 35 questions posed and Appendix B, which 
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provides an excerpt of NASA’s scoring for a set of functions as a foundational 
reference.  
The key questions posed in this thesis are: 
1. How can one design in proper levels of autonomy to optimize the 
human-operator team? 
2. How can one design in levels of autonomy to enable greater 
systems resilience? 
3. What aspects of the derived level of autonomy and design 
information can be modeled in order to test the autonomous 
system? 
4. How can one “architect” resilience into autonomous systems in 
order to enhance the manned-unmanned interactions, engender 
trust, and reduce instead of increase the workload? 
The benefits of this research and study include: 
1. Providing an initial foundation of research into defining levels of 
autonomy and assess benefits of furthering such research. 
2. Lessons learned regarding the process of defining levels of 
autonomy and whether or not NASA’s Function-specific Level of 
Autonomy and Automation tool has merit as applied to an 
unmanned aerial system. 
3. Lessons learned about the definition of adjustable autonomy as it 
applies to architecting a resilient system, leveraging the framework 
provided by Vaneman and Triantis. 
4. Recommendations on designing the human-system interface in 
order to engender trust and allow for advancement in the 
employment of autonomous systems. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Resilience connotes the ability to spring back, to recover. Today, with the 
advancement of autonomy and robotics, attention has also moved toward 
applying the concept of resilience to these engineered systems where reliability 
and fault prediction or failure modes and effects have dominated system design. 
When examining autonomy in 2012, the Defense Science Board noted that 
systems were brittle as opposed to resilient (DSB 2012). Brittleness arises when 
a system is not designed to work in all of the scenarios that could be 
encountered during the use of the system. This is of concern for deterministic 
systems, as failure modes cannot be exhaustively anticipated. Hence, the focus 
of this research is on methods to build a system that can react and adapt to 
counteract the unintended brittleness. 
The Introduction of this thesis sets the stage by providing an overview of 
the definition of resilience as it applies to engineered systems and systems of 
systems. It also suggests that the field of adjustable autonomy could be an 
approach improves system resilience. This chapter takes the next step and 
provides more detailed discussion of relevant technical terms and presents an 
overview of research in the domains of resilience and autonomy. It also provides 
an overview of a tool that NASA developed to define and design autonomy 
levels. This thesis proposes to take this tool and adapts it for employment on an 
unmanned aerial system. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Resilience 
Within technical fields, the use of the term resilience has a tradition in 
materials science (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011). Martin-Breen and Anderies 
suggest that the definition of resilience should be customized to the discipline to 
which it is applied. Only then is context, which can be important, considered. 
They also note the problem with systems is that they are deterministic; they 
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cannot adapt. Hence, Martin-Breen and Anderies suggest there is a need to 
design in the means for systems to adapt in order to be resilient (Martin-Breen 
and Anderies 2011). 
Vaneman and Triantis studied resilience engineering in a system of 
systems context and have proposed definitions appropriate for this domain. In 
their presentation they note that Resiliency is the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions (natural or man-made) through planning on how to absorb (withstand) 
and rapidly recover from adverse events and disruptions (Vaneman and Triantis 
2014).  Important to systems design and engineering efforts, Vaneman and 
Triantis also address resilience in systems architecture.  They note that systems 
architecture is resilient if it can provide the necessary operational functions, with 
a higher probability of success and shorter periods of reduced capabilities before, 
during and after an adverse condition or disruption through avoidance, 
robustness, recovery and reconstitution (Vaneman and Triantis 2014). In doing 
so, they suggest four architectural principles to strive for: 
• Avoidance: proactive or reactive measures taken to reduce the 
likelihood or impact of adverse conditions or threats.  
• Robustness: design feature to resist functional degradation and 
enhance survivability.  
• Recovery: actions and design features that restore a lost capability 
to meet a specific mission set (perhaps the most critical mission 
set). 
• Reconstitution: actions and design [that] features a measure of how 
much the total capability can be replaced, and the time it takes to 
achieve [the replacement] (Vaneman and Triantis 2014). 
These elements are further defined by architectural attributes as listed in 
Figure 1 below. The figure shows, as an example, that the ability for a system to 
avoid degradation comes from operational flexibility, flexibility in policies and 
procedures, loose coupling, and extendibility. Vaneman and Triantis suggest a 
set of attributes for each of the architectural principles and imply that 
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consideration of them early in the lifecycle will aid in designing in resiliency into a 
system (Vaneman and Triantis 2014). 
 
Figure 1.  Architectural attributes that enable a resilient systems 
architecture (from Vaneman and Triantis 2014) 
Consideration of these elements help frame the design process to 
consider these attributes early in the architecting process. As an example, 
thinking through how to enable “policy and procedures flexibility” early on may 
result in derived requirements that provide the option for a higher number of 
levels of autonomy in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility. In fact, 
consideration of this and other architectural attributes that comprise “Avoidance” 
has influenced the definition of adjustable autonomy for an Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS), discussed in the next chapter. This design consideration needs to 
be contemplated up front.  If they were not, the development of the system could 
incur significant additional cost if the applications were to be redesigned to 
improve “policy and procedure flexibility". It is this set of architectural attributes 
that are later employed to help designers consider elements that improve 
resilience. 
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In a fairly recent work, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Resilience 
Engineering,” Madni and Jackson provide a framework to look at engineering in 
resilience (Madni and Jackson, 2009). Their section on heuristics describes 
fourteen attributes that characterize resilient systems. Figure 2 below lists these 
fourteen heuristics.   
 
Figure 2.  List of Resilience Heuristics (from Madni and Jackson 2009) 
Functional	  
Redundancy
there	  should	  be	  alternative	  ways	  to	  perform	  a	  particular	  
function	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  same	  physical	  systems
Physical	  
Redundancy
employ	  redundant	  hardware	  (e.g.	  processors)	  to	  protect	  
against	  hardware	  failure	  when	  functional	  redundancy	  is	  
not	  possible
Reorganization
system	  should	  be	  able	  to	  restructure	  itself	  in	  response	  to	  
external	  change
Human	  Backup
humans	  should	  be	  able	  to	  back	  up	  automation	  when	  there	  
is	  a	  context	  change	  that	  automation	  is	  not	  sensitive	  to	  and	  
when	  there	  is	  sufficient	  time	  for	  human	  intervention
Human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
Loop
humans	  should	  be	  in	  the	  loop	  when	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  
"rapid	  cognition"	  and	  creative	  opionion	  generation
Predictability
automated	  systems	  should	  behave	  in	  predictable	  ways	  to	  
assure	  trust	  and	  not	  evoke	  frequent	  human	  over-­‐ride
Complexity	  
Avoidance
systems	  should	  reflect	  system	  complexity	  and	  not	  
complexity	  added	  by	  poor	  human	  design	  practices
Context	  
Spanning
system	  should	  be	  able	  to	  survive	  most	  likely	  and	  worst	  
case	  scenarios,	  either	  natural	  or	  man-­‐made
Graceful	  
Degradation
systems	  performance	  should	  degrade	  gradually	  when	  the	  
unexpected	  occurs	  for	  which	  system	  is	  not	  prepared
Drift	  correction
system	  should	  be	  able	  to	  monitor	  and	  correct	  dreft	  toward	  
brittleness	  by	  making	  appropriate	  tradeoffs	  and	  taking	  
timely	  preventative	  action
"Neutral"	  state
system	  should	  be	  able	  to	  prevent	  further	  damage	  from	  
occurring	  when	  hit	  with	  an	  unknown	  perturbation	  until	  
problem	  can	  be	  diagnosed
Inspectability
system	  should	  allow	  for	  human	  intervention	  needed	  




system	  and	  humans	  should	  maintain	  a	  shared	  intent	  
model	  to	  back	  up	  each	  other	  when	  called	  upon
Learning/	  
Adaptation
continually	  acquiring	  new	  knowledge	  from	  the	  
environment	  to	  recognifgure,	  reoptimize	  and	  grow
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Heuristics are experience-based frames of reference to employ when 
thinking about a topic. Of the fourteen, two, highlighted in yellow in the figure, 
consider that humans are essential elements of a resilient system. Humans 
should be able to backup automation when change occurs and that humans 
should be in the loop when there is a need for rapid cognition (Madni and 
Jackson 2009). 
Jackson and Ferris (2012) take these concepts further when they 
establish the “human in control” principle. They posit that the human operator 
should retain final decision making authority in critical situations unless the 
pressure of time demands a quick decision. They further list an “automated 
function” principle that suggests automating certain types of tasks: (1) those that 
need to be performed quickly, in a split second; (2) those that are not too 
complex–where their definition of complexity does not include an uncertain, 
unpredictable situation; and (3) where a task is boring, repetitive, or distracting. 
(Jackson and Ferris 2012). The latter two address the role of a human and the 
role of a robot, respectively. These two principles are important to adjustable 
autonomy as they provide frames of reference with which to consider different 
tasks and functions and how automated they should be.  
It is important to highlight these principles in the context of resilience as it 
reinforces that human-operators are important components of a system and 
should be positioned appropriately in any system in order to improve resilience of 
that system, especially when included in aspects or during times where 
automation backup is required, when the human-operators anticipatory skills are 
needed. Conversely, the principles note where human-operators are NOT ideal—
when tasks are extremely fast, boring and lengthy, or repetitive.  
Zieba et al. (2009) formally link adjustable autonomy with resilience. They 
note that adjustable autonomy is a means to adapt the system to situations 
anticipated and unanticipated. They show how a system’s ability to recover is 
enhanced when the human performs what he is best at and the robot performs 
what it is best at. The results of their experiment illustrate how the human-
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operator and system, as a collective, work together to achieve the mission at a 
higher level of resilience, based on measures they have assigned. When 
properly designed and positioned, they conclude that human-robot collaborative 
control is a means to increase the resilience of an autonomous system. (Zieba et 
al. 2009). Hence, it is important to design in autonomy to optimize the division of 
control between the human and the system to result in a more resilient system. 
2. Autonomy 
An autonomous system has to be resilient in order to adapt to unplanned 
events. Resilience heuristics provide a framework to employ in autonomous 
systems design, enabling systems to adapt and recover from unanticipated 
problems. This activity, in and of itself, improves resilience of a system. But, 
before discussing autonomy and why adjustable autonomy improves the 
resilience of an unmanned system, it is important to define the terms and provide 
background on research that has shown how the two relate.  
Autonomy does not have a single unified definition. In fact, the word is 
more widely used in social, political and psychological domains, where it 
connotes self-determination (Christman 2009). The autonomous systems domain 
that has evolved since the 1950s and 1960s has adopted the word for the simple 
reason that it does mean to self-determine how to operate. Gregory Dorais, a 
NASA expert and researcher on intelligent systems and human-centered 
automation, is considered as one of the pioneers of “adjustable autonomy.” His 
research dates back to the early 1990s. He defined an adjustable autonomous 
system as a control system that has the ability to 1) be completely in control; 2) 
be able to supervise manual control; or 3) be able to shift among these control 
extremes in a safe and efficient manner (Dorais and Kortenkamp 2008). Further, 
a system’s “adjustable autonomy” can involve changes in: the complexity of the 
commmands it executes; the resources (including time) consumed by its 
operation; the circumstances for when it will request user information or control; 
the circumstances when it will override or allow manual control; the number of 
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subsystems that are being controlled autonomously (Dorias and Kortenkamp 
2008). 
Chad Frost, then director of the NASA Ames Autonomous Systems and 
Robotics Division, clarified in a speech he gave in 2010 the difference between 
autonomy and automation. He noted that “Many definitions are possible...but 
here we focus on the need to make choices...an automated system doesn’t make 
choices for itself, it follows a script. If it encounters an unplanned situation, it 
stops and waits for human assistance. Thus, for an autonomated system, 
choices have either already been made or they must be made externally. By 
contrast, an autonomous system does make choices on its own and tries to 
accomplish objectives without human intervention, even when encountering 
uncertainty” (Frost 2010, pg 2). 
Relevant research in autonomous systems can be classified under five 
areas: autonomous robots, tele-operation, adjustable autonomy, mixed initiatives, 
and advanced interfaces (Goodrich et al. 2001). An autonomous robot is a robot 
that performs behaviors or tasks with a high degree of autonomy; an autonomous 
robot may also learn or gain new knowledge like adjusting for new methods of 
accomplishing its tasks or adapting to changing surroundings (Dorais and 
Kortenkamp, 2008). 
Telerobotics is the area of robotics concerned with the control of semi-
autonomous robots from a distance, using wireless or tethered connections 
(Sheridan 1992). Mixed-initiative systems integrate human and automated 
reasoning to take advantage of their complementary reasoning styles and 
computational strengths (Tecuci et al. 2003). This area of research addresses 
the division of responsibility between the human and autonomous system, 
control, shared awareness, exchange of information/knowledge, and situation 
evaluation.  
The adjustable autonomy domain takes into account the adjustment of the 
degree or level of autonomy a system exhibits. It keeps the human-operator 
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involved, in control, by allowing him to trade-off between the convenience offered 
by autonomy, and the amount of control he would like to exert (Dorais and 
Kortenkamp, 2008). When humans and machines share responsibility for 
achieving a specific task, responsibility can be thought of as shifting between the 
human and the robot along a continuum of fully manual or fully automated. This 
underpins the concept of adjustable autonomy. Adjustable autonomy was 
introduced for supervisory control of robotic systems at specific levels along this 
continuum (Bonasso et al. 1997). NASA notes that much of their approach 
derives from Bonasso et al. (1997), where manual and automated control 
methods for each task was defined and the level of autonomy could be selected. 
3. Supervisory Control 
Given that the goal is to design in a level of autonomy–or a form of 
“supervisory control,” it is necessary to discuss research in this domain. The term 
“supervisory control” is a general term for control of a control system. A control 
system is a device, or set of devices, that manages commands, directs or 
regulates the behavior of other device(s) or system(s) control loops, whether by a 
human or an automatic control system. When contemplating autonomy, there 
naturally arises the question of the level of control that a human-operator should 
have or desires.  
Sheridan (1976) was one of the first to assign control levels to robots. 
Most autonomy researchers use this as a reference for an initial understanding of 
how humans and computers interact. Sheridan focused on telerobotics where the 
human is physically separated from the system, but still issuing commands 
(Sheridan and Johannesen 1976). The most relevant information comes from 
Sheridan’s work on trust development, such as reliability, robustness, familiarity, 
usefulness, and dependence (Sheridan 1992). Note some of these trust 
attributes are the same or similar to those architectural attributes called for in 
architecting resilient systems. In dealing with these trust issues, Sheridan 
proposed a ten-level scale of automation as depicted in Table 1 (1992). 
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Examination of the levels note that Levels 2 through 4 are centered on who 
makes the decisions, the human or the computer. Levels 5–9 are centered on 
how to execute that decision. Levels 1 and 10 are end-bounds for either extreme 
(Sheridan 1992). 
Table 1.   Sheridan Model of Autonomy (from Sheridan 1992) 
 
 
Subsequently, in 2000, Parasuraman provided a revised model for the 
levels of automation. His model kept the ten levels but split the tasks performed 
into four categories: “information acquisition; information analysis; decision and 
action selection; and action implementation” (Parasuraman 2000).  
Parasuraman’s framework is depicted in Figure 3 below.  
“Sheridan”	  Model	  -­‐	  levels	  of	  autonomy
1)	  Computer	  offers	  no	  assistance,	  human	  must	  do	  it	  all.
2)	  Computer	  offers	  a	  complete	  set	  of	  action	  alternatives,	  and
3)	  narrows	  the	  selection	  down	  to	  a	  few,	  or
4)	  suggests	  one,	  and
5)	  executes	  that	  suggestion	  if	  the	  human	  approves,	  or
6)	  allows	  the	  human	  a	  restricted	  time	  to	  veto	  before	  automatic	  execution,	  or
7)	  executes	  automatically,	  then	  necessarily	  informs	  the	  human,	  or
8)	  informs	  him	  after	  execution	  only	  if	  he	  asks,	  or
9)	  informs	  him	  after	  execution	  if	  it,	  the	  computer,	  decides	  to.
10)	  Computer	  decides	  everything	  and	  acts	  autonomously,	  ignoring	  the	  human.
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Figure 3.  Levels of Autonomy from a Computer's Perspective 
(from Parasuraman 2000) 
Information acquisition is the task of sensing, monitoring, and bringing 
information to a human’s attention (Parasuraman, 2000).  Information analysis is 
performing all of the processing, predictions, and general analysis tasks. 
Decision and action selection result in making choices. For example, “Based on 
the available analysis, what should the system do?” Action implementation is 
acting on decisions or commanding new actions. Levels in this category include 
the computer asking for authority to proceed and allowing human overrides. The 
breakdown of a decision in this decision making sequence enabled more precise 
interpretation of a level of autonomy for any one particular system (Parasuraman 
2000).  
Parasuraman’s 4 categories approached a task from the perspective of 
the computer. NASA’s Proud and Hart (2005) switched the perspective to that of 
a human-operator and took a chapter from military decision-making. They saw a 
similar 4-tiered system in Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) 
framework (Boyd 1996). According to Proud and Hart (2005), Boyd’s system 
added two important characteristics--feedback and implicit control. Feedback is 
obtained during the decision cycle, and decisions do not necessarily have to 
become actions. Decisions themselves can spark new analysis tasks or requests 
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for new observations, but not result in actions (Proud and Hart 2005). And, 
implicit control refers to the fact that there could be an entity that retains control 
whether or not there is an explicit action. The example given is a flight control 
processor that has implicit control of the vehicle and will continue to carry out the 
management of the vehicle unless otherwise commanded (Proud and Hart 
2005).  
Since this thesis involves assessing levels of autonomy of a UAS, it is 
important to present research relevant to supervisory control in the aviation 
domain. In the world of aircraft control, the first control rating was developed by 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the predecessor to 
NASA, called the Cooper-Harper rating scale (Lintern and Hughes 2008; NASA 
History Web Site 2014a). The Cooper-Harper rating scale is a set of criteria used 
by test pilots and flight test engineers to evaluate the handling qualifies of aircraft 
during flight test. The scale ranges from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the best 
handling characteristics and 10 the worst. (Lintern and Hughes 2008). The Air 
Force Research Lab has since investigated several permutations of the Cooper-
Harper scale, and others have developed alternatives, in attempts to overcome 
some of the flaws of the Cooper-Harper scale. However, it is the one scale that is 
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III. METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF 
AUTONOMY TO DESIGN INTO AN AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM 
Increased autonomy in unmanned systems, trusted by the operators, is 
necessary for the next-generation of Naval Airborne systems, to meet cost, 
safety, and mission requirements. Detailed, manual work sometimes makes 
humans feel in control; in reality, humans may not be the most suitable for some 
of the functions they perform. But humans will not willingly relinquish control 
unless they are confident that what they are giving control over to will do the job 
just as well. They need to trust the system. Ideally, the autonomous system 
should augment the human, perhaps raising their capability to a higher level, and 
not just take over certain tasks. An example is the F/A-18 Launch function; it is 
autonomous because at low speeds the F/A-18 is highly unstable and human 
control is too slow to operate it successfully (Isby 1997). The human is there, 
ready to fly the plane, but is not in control of this specific function where his 
reaction time is too long.  
Building on the foundation provided by in the literature review, this chapter 
details the methodology applied to modify NASA’s Function-specific Level of 
Autonomy Tool to an unmanned system. Why NASA and why this tool? For one 
thing, NASA has pioneered the development of autonomous systems. Launch of 
Deep Space 1 almost fifteen years ago, in 1998, demonstrated the feasibility of a 
fully autonomous spacecraft (Frost 2010). Much of the research on autonomous 
systems and their interface with humans have been conducted by NASA as they 
embarked on this journey to enable autonomous space missions. Furthermore, 
this tool has some pedigree, as it has been applied and used on several of the 
systems, to include the Centaur, the International Space Station, the Crew Entry 
Vehicle and others (Proud and Hart 2005). Therefore, it has foundation and has 
been verified and validated in several different applications. Thirdly, it directly 
addressed trust issues that humans have with autonomous systems by limiting 
the amount of autonomy to be made available to that amount which the 
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questionnaire-tool noted as the notional limitation in trust. And, finally, the tool 
employed autonomy level definitions that were meant for designers of the 
system. This is an important distinction and frame of reference. Levels of 
autonomy are necessary for researchers to partition and frame the problem, for 
designers to engineer the system, and for operators, to define the control they 
trust. 
A. DERIVATION OF NASA’S LEVEL OF AUTONOMY RATING TOOL 
“FLOAAT” 
The space community had been investigating how to properly design in 
autonomy since the early 1990s (Dorais et al. 1998). The community started to 
implement an increasing amount of autonomy, looking at automating functions 
that had been manually managed by human operators in ground control. This 
initial foray into the field was motivated by potential cost savings (Proud and Hart 
2005). Computer advancements, the emergence of highly reliable decision-
making algorithms, and the emphasis on efficiency made this possible. However, 
they discovered that for some human spaceflight applications, full autonomy was 
impractical (Dorais et al, 1999). What NASA learned was that a balance had to 
be struck between how much human operators trusted automation, and how 
much benefit and cost savings automation provided (Proud and Hart, 2005). 
NASA’s motivation was cost; its issue was trust (Proud and Hart 2005). In 
the early 2000s, Proud and Hart embarked on defining an engineering approach 
to 1) define levels of autonomy that incorporated the concept of trust into 
functions and 2) enable the definitions to be used as systems requirements 
(Proud and Hart 2005). NASA scientists identified system functions and analyzed 
each function to determine how much autonomy could be tolerated and what 
level of autonomy to design for that function (Proud and Hart 2005). They 
ascertained the level by implementing a tool—a questionnaire that elicited from a 
set of human operators what they though should be automated. The employed 
Level of Autonomy Tool was designed to determine the division of labor between 
computers and humans for the various functions. Adaptations were made to add 
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questions that ferret out design issues addressing division of labor between the 
ground and onboard systems. NASA implemented its approach in a tool called 
the Function-specific Level of Autonomy Assessment Tool (Proud and Hart 
2005). FLOAAT essentially is a mechanism to assess the levels of supervisory 
control desired for a specific function. The tool contains 35 questions about the 
execution of a select number of functions for a system. The questions are 
intended to draw out from subject matter experts, some being engineers of a 
certain domain, some being designers, some being human operators, on how 
confident he/she would be if a computer would have full control of the said 
functions. A portion of the questions also draw out whether there is a return on 
investment, or what the cost was for the benefit of automating a certain function. 
The cost could, conceivably, be too high. 
NASA divided the 35 questions into two primary categories–a set that gets 
at the heart of how much a human-operator would trust the system if the function 
were to be handled fully autonomously; these are called “Trust Questions,” and a 
second set that considered the cost of designing and developing a capability to 
make a function fully autonomous; these are called “Cost/Benefit Questions.” 
Trust questions number 20 and address issues such as complexity, software 
design capacity, robustness, art vs. science and other similar trust issues.  Cost 
questions number 15 and cover categories such as usefulness (of automation), 
timeliness, criticality and safety. Table 2 depicts the categories and general 
description of what the questions are trying to elicit. The full set of the questions 
for the two categories of trust and cost/benefit can be found in Appendix A.  One 
can see that the questions span a wide range of areas that are all pertinent to 




Table 2.   Description of FLOAAT Tool Questions 
(from Proud and Hart 2005) 
 
 
Category Nature	  of	  Questions
Trust	  Questions	  -­‐	  20
Ability
This	  category	  attempts	  to	  derive	  what	  level	  of	  ability	  system	  designers	  are	  required	  to	  have	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  develop	  the	  algorithm	  and	  integrate	  it	  into	  the	  function	  correctly,	  and	  within	  the	  timeline	  
required.	  	  
Robustness
Questions	  in	  this	  category	  attempt	  to	  define	  how	  robust	  of	  a	  design	  is	  required	  for	  the	  function-­‐	  
is	  there	  an	  opportunity	  for	  an	  "out	  of	  the	  box"	  scenario	  to	  occur.
Experience
Questions	  get	  at	  what	  experience	  exists	  in	  automating	  the	  function	  in	  question.	  	  The	  more	  
experience	  of	  having	  a	  certain	  function	  automated,	  the	  more	  general	  knowledge	  exist	  on	  how	  to	  
properly	  design	  the	  function	  and	  how	  human-­‐operators	  react	  and	  handle	  situations	  involving	  the	  
function.	  How	  autonomous	  (what	  level)	  has	  the	  function	  been	  shown	  to	  perform?
Understandability
This	  category	  gets	  at	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  function	  and	  how	  much	  understanding	  (to	  include	  
training)	  does	  the	  human-­‐operator	  need.	  	  Do	  operators	  have	  a	  mental	  model	  of	  how	  the	  function	  
should	  work?	  	  Understanding	  pertains	  to	  not	  just	  the	  function,	  but	  understanding	  the	  mission	  
environment	  and	  knowing	  what	  to	  do	  next.	  	  
Art	  vs	  Science
This	  category	  attempts	  to	  derive	  if	  the	  function	  could	  be	  performed	  by	  humans	  based	  on	  using	  
their	  experience	  (Heuristics)	  vice	  a	  fully	  optimal	  solution
Familiarity
This	  category	  derives	  information	  on	  if	  the	  human-­‐operators	  would	  be	  familiar	  with	  output	  of	  an	  
agent	  or	  if	  the	  function	  were	  fully	  automated.	  	  "How	  natural	  would	  the	  output	  feel"?	  
Training
What	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  the
computer	  could	  come	  up	  with	  an	  answer	  that	  is	  "more	  accurate"	  than	  a	  human?
Override
This	  category	  derives	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  override	  is	  necessary	  -­‐	  which	  it	  usually	  is.	  	  One	  of	  the	  
issues	  is	  V&V	  of	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  agent	  performing	  certain	  functions.	  
Determinisitic
Questions	  in	  this	  category	  derive	  how	  deterministic	  the	  output	  for	  the	  function	  is	  required	  to	  be.	  
Cost	  Questions	  -­‐	  15
Usefulness Questions	  in	  this	  category	  elicit	  how	  useful	  automating	  the	  function	  would	  be.
Time Questions	  in	  this	  category	  elicit	  how	  much	  time	  might	  be	  saved	  by	  automating	  the	  function
Criticality Questions	  in	  this	  category	  request	  how	  flight	  or	  safety	  critical	  the	  function	  is.	  	  The	  premise	  is	  
that	  these	  functions	  may	  cost	  more	  to	  automate.	  
Costs Questions	  on	  cost	  range	  from	  #	  of	  lines	  of	  cose	  to	  how	  long	  it	  might	  take	  to	  implement	  the	  
function	  in	  software.
Efficiency/Task	  Mgt To	  what	  degree	  would	  automating	  this	  function	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  human?
Mental	  Workload To	  what	  degree	  would	  automating	  this	  function	  decrease	  a	  human's	  mental	  workload?
Boredom
Questions	  in	  this	  category	  elicit	  how	  repetitious	  is	  the	  function;	  the	  more	  repetitious,	  the	  more	  
benefit	  automation	  might	  have
How	  difficult/complex	  of	  a	  design	  effort	  is	  it	  to	  properly	  automate	  the	  function	  in	  question.	  	  
Questions	  get	  at	  technical	  difficulty	  and	  schedule	  difficulty	  (i.e	  within	  the	  timeframe	  required)Difficulty
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B. ADAPTATION OF FLOAAT FOR A UAS 
Having described the general structure of FLOAAT and aspects of its 
derivation, this section describes how the tool was adapted for application to an 
unmanned aerial system. The first step was to determine a set of functions to be 
scored. The second step was to evaluate the rating scale for applicability, and 
adapt it where necessary. The third step included examining the NASA FLOAAT 
questions to ensure transferability to a UAS and to include questions that 
established architectural considerations that would enhance the resilience of the 
system. The application of these adaptations is detailed in Chapter IV as applied 
to a set of UAS functions. 
1. Functional Architecture of an Unmanned Aerial System 
Before delving into function selection to assess which level of autonomy is 
appropriate for that function, it is important to present a general functional 
architecture of a UAS. There does not exist a standard UAS functional 
architecture. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has 
commissioned a cross-DOD project to build a common UAS control capability 
(UAS Control Segment (UCS) Working Group 2014). This thesis presents and 
references aspects of the OSD architecture to represent community level 
commonality and wide audience consumption. 
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system consists of numerous 
subsystems and components that must seamlessly interact in order to meet its 
objectives. The payload is a complex system of systems in and of itself, often 
with numerous complex operating modes that generates considerable volumes of 
data in a short time. Communication links are required to transmit the current 
state of the vehicle as well as sensor data to mission or ground control so that 
operators can assess and evaluate the data. Mission control is provided through 
the a ground or surface based mission management capability that leverages 
communications to talk to the unmanned aircraft flight control and mission 
management computers. The mission control is the ground system that provides 
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the UAV operators with aircraft and environmental situational awareness, 
collaboration, and decision-making tools. It is used to support pre-flight planning, 
monitoring missions schedules, direct the payload system, visualization, and 
integrate sensing goals into the mission planning (Sullivan et al. 2004). 
Figure 4 below depicts the top-level use cases performed by DOD UASs. 
The range is extensive, from strike to communications relay to moving cargo. 
“Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Mission Task” is 
circled in red, as that is the type of UAS employed as an example of function 
selection for this thesis. 
 
Figure 4.  Contextual Use Cases for an Unmanned Control System 
(from UCS Control Segment Working Group 2014) 
The UAS Control Segment Architecture Description published by OSD 
contains extensive architectural artifacts on the overall UAS control system effort 
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and is pulling the community together to build out a control system that is open, 
modular, and that, eventually, can control different types of unmanned aerial 
vehicles. At present, most UAVs are slewed to the control station that was built 
when the air vehicle was built. 
From the overall operational use case view, stakeholder analysis, and 
functional analysis, the following functional architecture for a UAS shown in 
Figures 5 and 6 is derived: 
 
Figure 5.  Functional Architecture of a UAS 
 
Figure 6.  Functions Performed by UAS Segments 
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This process of decomposing top level functions and allocating them to a 
top level physical architecture helped frame the functions that were derived and 
employed in the analysis for this thesis. Table 3 depicts the functions derived, 
and provides and provides a short definition of each function.  This process of 
system decomposition and definition is important, as it provides a frame of 
reference for the definitions of the functions.  In Chapter IV, this same list will be 
presented along with the decision-making category, for example, Observe, 
Orient, Decide or Act, each function was assigned. 
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Table 3.   A Set of UAS Mission Functions 




2. Adaptation of the Supervisory Control Reference Scale 
Besides the fact that the tool was applied to a set of UAS functions vice 
spacecraft functions, a second modification applied was to the rating levels. 
NASA employed five levels. What ultimately was used for this research has ten. 
Two primary reasons influenced this decision: 1) Alignment with the scales of 
other supervisory control scales, to include the Cooper-Harper rating scale used 
within the world of aviation, and 2) to include increased detail for reference when 
determining the level of autonomy of a function. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the world of aviation is familiar with the 
Cooper-Harper scale. This scale was consulted as a factor for evaluating the 
levels as defined by NASA in FLOAAT. The Cooper-Harper rating scale is 
depicted below in Figure 7. Unlike the supervisory control scales presented in 
Chapter II, it focuses on aircraft handling qualities, not computer decision 
making. But, the frame of reference it provides is illustrative of what human-
operators connote as a good aircraft system, which is worth consulting in 




Figure 7.  Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale 
(from NASA History Web Site 2014b) 
Though the Cooper-Harper scale could not be adopted wholesale, since it 
addresses a different purpose, one characteristic did apply, and that was the 
rating scale. The ratings numbered from one to ten, which just so happened to be 
the same as that devised by Sheridan and by Parasuraman (Sheridan and 
Johannesen 1976; Parasuraman 2000). It was decided to move to a 1–10 rating 
scale versus retaining the 5-level scale employed by NASA. This alignment 
enabled more direct refinement of what each level of autonomy could mean for a 
UAS, in within the OODA framework adopted by NASA. What the adaptation 
involved was repurposing the 5-level categorization for a spacecraft, a direct 
depiction shown in Table 4, to that of a 10-level scale for a UAS, shown in Table 
5, both shown below.  
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Table 4.   NASA’s 5-pt Scale and Definition of the Levels of Autonomy 
(from Proud and Hart 2005) 
 
 
If one reads even only one column or one row of definitions, one starts to 
appreciate the difference in definition between the one for a spacecraft and that 
for a UAS. The spacecraft definitions often allude to whether or not the ground 
control element should be informed or in control. The rating scale that numbers 
from one to ten also should be remembered as each UAS function will have a 
resulting score that falls with this range and aligns with how much control the 
UAS has versus the human-operator. 
  
Level
Observe Orient Decide Act
3
The	  data	  is	  monitored	  both	  
onboard	  and	  on	  the	  ground.	  
The	  calculations	  are	  performed	  both	  
onboard	  and	  on	  the	  ground.	  
The	  decision	  is	  made	  both	  onboard	  
and	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  final	  
decision	  is	  negotiated	  between	  them.	  
The	  task	  is	  executed	  with	  both	  
onboard	  and	  ground	  support
2
The	  majority	  of	  the	  monitoring	  
will	  be	  performed	  by	  ground	  
support	  with	  available	  assistance	  
onboard	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  calculations	  will	  
be	  performed	  by	  ground	  support	  
with	  available	  assistance	  onboard	  
The	  decision	  will	  be	  made	  by	  ground	  
support	  with	  available	  assistance	  
onboard	  
The	  task	  is	  executed	  by	  ground	  
support	  with	  available	  assistance	  
onboard	  
1
The	  data	  is	  monitored	  on	  the	  
ground	  without	  assistance	  from	  
onboard	  
The	  calculations	  are	  performed	  on	  
the	  ground	  without	  assistance	  from	  
onboard	  
The	  decision	  is	  made	  on	  the	  ground	  
without	  assistance	  from	  onboard	  
The	  task	  is	  executed	  by	  ground	  
support	  without	  assistance	  from	  
onboard	  
4
The	  majority	  of	  the	  monitoring	  
will	  be	  performed	  onboard	  with	  
available	  assistance	  from	  ground	  
support	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  calculations	  will	  
be	  performed	  onboard	  with	  available	  
assistance	  from	  ground	  support	  
The	  decision	  will	  be	  performed	  
onboard	  with	  available	  assistance	  
from	  ground	  support	  
The	  task	  is	  executed	  onboard	  with	  
available	  assistance	  from	  ground	  
support	  
5
The	  data	  is	  monitored	  onboard	  
without	  assistance	  from	  ground	  
support	  
The	  calculations	  are	  performed	  
onboard	  without	  assistance	  from	  
ground	  support	  
The	  decision	  is	  made	  onboard	  without	  
assistance	  from	  ground	  support	  
The	  task	  is	  executed	  onboard	  
without	  assistance	  from	  ground	  
support	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Table 5.   Level of Autonomy Reference Rating Scale for a UAS 
(from Proud and Hart, 2005) 
 
 
Level Observe Orient Decide Act
10 UAS	  observes	  and	  monitors	  all	  
systems	  and	  commands	  and	  
acts	  autonomously,	  ignoring	  the	  
human
UAS	  gathers	  data	  and	  information	  
and	  interprets	  and	  integrates	  data	  
and	  prepares	  to	  take	  action	  without	  
involving	  the	  human-­‐operator.
UAS	  performs	  analyses	  and	  ranks	  
results	  for	  decision	  making,	  and	  
does	  not	  display	  results	  to	  the	  
human-­‐operator.
UAS	  observes	  and	  monitors,	  
analyzes,	  decides	  and	  acts	  
autonomously,	  ignoring	  the	  
human
9 UAS	  observes	  and	  monitors	  all	  
systems	  and	  commands	  and	  
acts	  autonomously,	  but	  informs	  
the	  human	  after	  execution
UAS	  gathers	  data	  and	  information	  
and	  interprets	  and	  integrates	  data	  
and	  prepares	  to	  take	  action	  
informing	  the	  human-­‐operator	  but	  
not	  waiting	  for	  consent.	  	  Does	  not	  
display	  results
UAS	  performs	  analyses	  and	  ranks	  
results	  for	  decision	  making,	  does	  
not	  display	  results	  to	  the	  human-­‐
operator,	  but	  will	  upon	  query
UAS	  observes	  and	  monitors	  all	  
systems	  and	  commands	  and	  acts	  
autonomously,	  but	  informs	  the	  
human	  after	  execution
8 The	  UAS	  gathers,	  filters,	  and	  
prioritizes	  data;	  displays	  
information	  only	  if	  asked
The	  UAS	  gathers	  data	  predicts,	  
interprets,	  and	  integrates	  data	  into	  
a	  result	  which	  is	  displayed	  to	  the	  
human-­‐operator	  only	  upon	  request
The	  UAS	  performs	  ranking	  tasks.	  
The	  UAS	  performs	  final	  ranking,	  but	  
does	  not	  display	  results	  to	  the	  
human.
UAS	  executes	  automatically	  and	  
does	  not	  allow	  any	  human	  
interaction.
7 The	  UAS	  gathers,	  filters,	  and	  
prioritizes	  data	  without
displaying	  any	  information	  to	  
mission	  control	  or	  the	  human.	  
Status	  on	  command	  execution	  is	  
provided,	  however.
The	  UAS	  anlayzes,	  predicts,	  
interprets,	  and	  integrates	  data	  into	  
a	  result	  which	  is	  only	  displayed	  to	  
the	  human	  if	  result	  fits	  
programmed	  context	  (context	  
dependant	  summaries).
The	  UAS	  performs	  ranking	  tasks.	  
The	  UAS	  performs	  final	  ranking	  and	  
displays	  a	  reduced	  set	  of	  ranked	  
options	  without	  displaying	  "why"	  
decisions	  were	  made	  to	  the	  human.
UAS	  executes	  automatically	  and	  
only	  informs	  the	  human	  if	  
required	  by	  context.	  It	  allows	  for	  
override	  ability	  after	  execution.	  
Human	  is	  shadow	  for	  
contingencies.
6 The	  UAS	  gathers,	  filters,	  and	  
prioritizes	  information	  displayed	  
to	  the	  human.
The	  UAS	  overlays	  predictions	  with	  
analysis	  and	  interprets	  the	  data.	  
The	  human	  is	  shown	  all	  results.
The	  UAS	  performs	  ranking	  tasks	  and	  
displays	  a	  reduced	  set	  of	  ranked	  
options	  while	  displaying	  "why"	  
decisions	  were	  made	  to	  the	  human.
UAS	  executes	  automatically,	  
informs	  the	  human,	  and	  allows	  
for	  override	  ability	  after	  
execution.	  Human	  is	  shadow	  for	  
contingencies.5 The	  UAS	  gathers	  information	  
from	  the	  subsystems	  and	  
environment,	  but	  it	  only	  
displays	  non-­‐	  prioritized,	  filtered	  
information.
The	  UAS	  overlays	  predictions	  with	  
analysis	  and	  interprets	  the	  data.	  
The	  human	  shadows	  the	  
interpretation	  for	  contingencies.
The	  UAS	  performs	  ranking	  tasks.	  All	  
results,	  including	  "why"	  decisions	  
were	  made,	  are	  displayed	  to	  the	  
human.
UAS	  allows	  the	  human	  a	  context-­‐
dependant	  restricted	  time	  to	  veto	  
before	  execution.	  Human	  
shadows	  for	  contingencies.
4 The	  UAS	  and	  mission	  control	  is	  
responsible	  for	  gathering	  the	  
information	  for	  the	  human	  and	  
for	  displaying	  all	  information,	  
but	  it	  highlights	  the	  non-­‐
prioritized,	  relevant	  information	  
for	  the	  user.
The	  UAS	  analyzes	  the	  data	  and	  
makes	  predictions,	  though	  the	  
human	  is	  responsible	  for	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  data.
Both	  human	  and	  UAS	  perform	  
ranking	  tasks,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  
UAS	  are	  considered	  prime.
UAS	  allows	  the	  human	  a	  pre-­‐
programmed	  restricted	  time	  to	  
veto	  before	  execution.	  Human	  
shadows	  for	  contingencies.
3 The	  UAS	  is	  responsible	  for	  
gathering	  and	  displaying	  
unfiltered,	  unprioritized	  
information	  for	  the	  human.	  The	  
human	  still	  is	  the	  prime	  monitor	  
for	  all	  information.
UAS	  is	  the	  prime	  source	  of	  analysis	  
and	  predictions,	  with	  human	  
shadow	  for	  contingencies.	  The	  
human	  is	  responsible	  for	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  data.
Both	  human	  and	  UAS	  perform	  
ranking	  tasks,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  
human	  are	  considered	  prime.
UAS	  executes	  decision	  after	  
human	  approval.	  Human	  shadows	  
for	  contingencies.
2 Human	  is	  the	  prime	  source	  for	  
gathering	  and	  monitoring	  all	  
data,	  with	  UAS	  shadow	  for	  
emergencies.
Human	  is	  the	  prime	  source	  of	  
analysis	  and	  predictions,	  with	  UAS	  
shadow	  for	  contingencies.	  The	  
human	  is	  responsible	  for	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  data.
The	  human	  performs	  all	  ranking	  
tasks,	  but	  the	  UAS	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
tool	  for	  assistance.
Human	  is	  the	  prime	  source	  of	  
execution,	  with	  UAS/computer	  
assitance	  for	  contingencies.
1 Human	  is	  the	  only	  source	  for	  
gathering	  and	  monitoring	  
(defined	  as	  filtering,	  prioritizing	  
and	  understanding)	  all	  data.
Human	  is	  responsible	  for	  analyzing	  
all	  data,	  making	  predictions,	  and	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  data.
The	  UAS/mission	  control	  does	  not	  
assist	  in	  or	  perform	  ranking	  tasks.	  
Human	  must	  do	  it	  all.
Human	  alone	  can	  execute	  
decision.
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Each level for each decision-making category was redefined for a UAS 
leveraging the NASA scale, the Sheridan scale and the Parasuraman scale as an 
original reference. Ultimately, the scale is subjective; but, a careful read does 
show how each level is slightly different from the other as one moved from a low 
level of autonomy (levels 1–3) to a high level of autonomy (levels 8–10). In fact, 
the scale can be generally broken into three tiers: manual, autonomous with 
consent, and fully autonomous. 
3. Inclusion of Architectural Attributes for a Resilient System 
Before applying the FLOAAT set of 35 questions to UAS functions, each 
question was examined for applicability. The questions were also assessed as to 
whether they addressed resilience and, if not, if any appropriate wording could be 
added to enhance a designer’s thoughtfulness and consideration of architectural 
attributes that would lead to more resilient systems. Several enhancements were 
made. Table 6 presents the questions with modifications or enhancements 
shown in red font. Slight additions were made to certain categories in a way that 
would elicit consideration of resilience. The full set of questions with explanations 
for the questions are provided in Appendix A. Application of this questionnaire 
will be addressed in Chapter IV. 
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Table 6.   Adaptation of FLOAAT to Consider Architectural Attributes of 




What	  is	  the	  expected	  ability	  of	  developers	  to	  correctly	  design	  the	  function	  for	  all	  possibilities	  
within	  the	  design	  phase	  deadlines?
What	  is	  the	  expected	  ability	  of	  programmers	  to	  correctly	  implement	  the	  design	  within	  the	  
implementation	  deadlines?
Difficulty
What	  is	  the	  expected	  effort	  of	  developers	  to	  correctly	  design	  the	  function	  for	  all	  possibilities	  
within	  the	  design	  phase	  deadlines?
What	  is	  the	  expected	  effort	  of	  programmers	  to	  correctly	  implement	  the	  design	  within	  the	  
implementation	  deadlines?
Robustness
What	  is	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  "outside-­‐the-­‐	  box"	  scenario	  occurring?	  	  How	  could	  the	  human-­‐
operator	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  functional	  redudancy	  to	  negotiate	  the	  "out	  of	  the	  box"	  scenario?
How	  well	  will/can	  the	  function	  be	  designed	  to	  manage	  "outside-­‐the-­‐box"	  scenarios?
Experience
How	  autonomous	  (what	  level)	  has	  the	  function	  been	  shown	  to	  perform?	  	  Could	  the	  human-­‐
operator	  become	  too	  trustworthy	  and	  therefore	  become	  complacent?	  What	  functional	  
redudancy	  would	  be	  required	  if	  so?	  
Has	  the	  function	  been	  completed	  solely	  by	  a	  human	  during	  the	  flight	  phase	  itself?
Understandability
How	  understandable	  	  of	  a	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  function	  can	  a	  human	  create,	  including	  how	  the	  
function	  works,	  what	  the	  output	  means,	  how	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  function?
What	  is	  the	  level	  of	  human	  understanding	  required	  to	  accurately	  decide	  when	  an	  override	  is	  
necessary?	  	  
If	  an	  override	  is	  performed,	  what	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  human	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  solution	  
themselves?
Art	  vs	  Science
How	  much	  would	  a	  human	  have	  to	  infer	  what	  the	  computer	  "really	  meant"	  or	  what	  the	  
computer	  will	  do	  in	  the	  future?
Familiarity How	  familiar,	  friendly,	  and	  natural	  will	  the	  output	  feel	  to	  the	  user?
Correctness
What	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  computer	  could	  come	  up	  with	  an	  answer	  that	  is	  "more	  
accurate"	  than	  a	  human?
Training
How	  much	  training	  would	  be	  required	  for	  a	  human	  to	  perform	  this	  function	  instead	  of	  
performing	  the	  function	  highly	  autonomously?
How	  much	  training	  would	  be	  required	  for	  a	  human	  to	  interface	  with	  a	  tool	  using	  this	  function	  
based	  on	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  implementation	  	  of	  this	  function?	  	  How	  can	  this	  training	  
on	  the	  interface	  improve	  human	  response	  to	  improve	  adaptability?
How	  much	  verification	  would	  be	  required	  for	  this	  function	  to	  be	  trusted	  to	  perform	  fully	  
autonomously?
Override Is	  an	  override	  capability	  required	  (yes	  or	  no)?
Determinisitic
How	  deterministic	  is	  the	  output	  from	  this	  function?	  	  Can	  decision	  making	  be	  distributed	  
between	  the	  computer	  and	  human-­‐operator	  to	  improve	  resilience?
2 LOA	  Cost/Benefit	  	  Limit
Usefulness How	  critical	  is	  this	  function	  to	  an	  overall	  Autonomous	  Mission	  and	  Flight	  Management	  system?
How	  useful	  would	  automating	  this	  function	  be?
Time How	  much	  time	  is	  available	  to	  perform	  function,	  considering	  flight	  phase,	  circumstances,	  	  
possible	  contingencies,	  etc.?
Criticality What	  is	  the	  criticality	  of	  this	  function	  to	  vehicle	  safety?
What	  is	  the	  criticality	  of	  this	  function	  to	  crew	  safety?
Costs How	  many	  lines	  of	  code	  are	  expected?
low	  <=	  1000
med-­‐low	  <=	  10,000	  med	  <=	  50,000
med-­‐high	  <=	  100,000
high	  >100,000
	  How	  much	  time	  to	  design	  the	  function	  is	  expected?
How	  much	  time	  to	  implement	  the	  software	  for	  this	  function	  is	  expected?
What	  is	  the	  level	  of	  required	  verification	  and	  validation?
What	  is	  the	  required	  skill	  level	  of	  software	  writers?
Efficiency/Task	  Mgt To	  what	  degree	  would	  automating	  this	  function	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  human?
Mental	  Workload
To	  what	  degree	  would	  automating	  this	  function	  decrease	  a	  human's	  mental	  workload?	  	  Are	  
there	  approaches	  to	  automating	  this	  function	  that	  would	  enhance	  operator	  flexibility?
Boredom How	  repetitious	  is	  the	  function	  (level	  of	  frequency)?
How	  mundane	  (does	  not	  utilize	  the	  skills	  of	  the	  operator)	  is	  the	  function?
FLOAAT	  Questionnaire	  Adapted	  to	  include	  architecture	  attributes	  to	  improve	  resilience
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTION-SPECIFIC LEVEL OF 
AUTONOMY AND AUTOMATION TOOL TO AN UNMANNED AIR 
SYSTEM 
Having described the methodology of FLOAAT and the logic and analysis 
that underpins it, as well as adaptations that were made, this section presents 
how the tool was applied to a set of UAS functions and the resulting lessons 
learned. The application of the tool followed the same steps that NASA 
employed. The steps are as follows: 1) categorize each function according to the 
decision-making framework; 2) for each function, answer the 35-question 
questionnaire; 3) collect the resulting score and compare with the OODA 
framework for a second reference and check; 4) collect the scores for all the 
functions and evaluate them in a summary form. 
A. CATEGORIZING UAS FUNCTIONS INTO THE OODA FRAMEWORK 
Table 7 below depicts the list of 34 functions that were scored for the level 
of autonomy required. This figure is also provided in Appendix B as an 
embedded Microsoft Excel file in case additional detail is desired. The functions 
are listed by four main phases of a typical mission–pre-mission planning, take off, 
mission execution, then landing and include a short definition of the function in 
the right column. Pre-planning is divided into establishment of mission objectives 
and route planning. Mission Execution consists of Flight Route Assessment and 
ISR Mission Assessment. Examination of the list shows that some functions are 
as simple as obtaining status of avionics, to more complex functions that provide 
an optimization for the mission or a segment of the mission.  
This list of functions is the same that were derived through systems 
decomposition and functional analysis shown in Chapter III (Table 3), except that 
in this case each is color-coded. The coloring of each function depicts how each 
was categorized according to the OODA framework. The color code is at the top 
of the table, with each of the four categories assigned a different color. The 
purpose for this categorization is so that the appropriate rating level and 
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interpretation is employed as reference (see Table 5 in Chapter III) when filling 
out the Level of Autonomy Questionnaire. 
For example, the levels in the “Observe” column refer to gathering, 
monitoring, and filtering data; the levels in the “Orient” column refer to deriving a 
list of options through analysis, trend prediction, interpretation and integration; 
the levels in the “Decide” column refer to decision-making based on ranking 
available options; and the levels in the “Act” column refer to how autonomously 
the UAS takes action on a chosen option.  
The intent is to help system designers to identify the level of autonomy for 
a function. When the levels for each category were redefined to ten rating levels, 
care was taken to provide more specific verbal description for each level. 
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Table 7.   UAS Functions defined and categorized  
 
 
Observe Orient Decide Act
Stage
Function
Number Function	  Name Function	  Description
Pre-­‐Planning Mission	  Plan	  Provisioning
Mission	  Objectives
1 Objective	  Function	  Selection Decide	  which	  objective	  to	  select	  in	  order	  to	  
complete	  mission
2 Nominal	  Take-­‐Off,	  Cruise	  to	  Mission	  Area	  Flight	  Constraints Determine	  mission	  contraints	  based	  on	  
environmental	  and	  system	  limitations
3 Flight	  Route	  Optimization	  Analysis	  (Against	  Sensing	  Objectives) Determine,	  baed	  on	  provided	  mission	  
objectives,	  approach	  to	  route	  optimization
Route	  Planning
4 Weather,	  Environment	  Data	  and	  Information Research,	  retrieve	  environmental	  information	  
related	  to	  the	  mission
5 Vehicle/Flight	  Model	  Interpretation	  &	  Check Retrieve	  appropriate	  model	  for	  air	  vechile	  to	  
enable	  evaluation	  of	  performance	  on	  
recommended	  route
6 Predict	  Take	  Off-­‐On	  Mission	  Performance	  Margin Provide	  potential	  performance	  measures	  of	  
planned	  mission	  to	  assess	  the	  margin	  of	  
performance	  
7 Sensor	  System	  Evaluation Provide	  evaluation	  of	  sensor	  system	  
status/performance	  based	  on	  mission	  
objectives	  and	  onboard	  sensor	  capabilities
8 Flight	  Route	  Performance	  and	  Constraint	  Evaluation Evaluate	  whether	  route	  is	  flyable	  based	  on	  
known	  constraints	  and	  available	  mission	  
avionics/fuel.
9 Evaluate	  Mission	  Area	  Coverage Evaluate	  how	  well	  mission	  area	  is	  covered	  by	  
available	  sensors	  and	  flight	  capability
10 Evaluate	  Flight	  Abort	  Coverage	  and	  Contingencies Evaluate	  whether	  planned	  contingencies	  and	  
aboard	  air	  bases	  are	  valid
11 Route	  Optimization	  Decision Determine/decide	  on	  optimal	  route	  for	  the	  
mission.
12 	  	  	  	  	  	  Mission/Flight	  Route	  Generation	  -­‐	  Accept/Reject Decide	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  planner	  
recommended	  mission	  plan	  is	  acceptable	  or	  
reject	  for	  further	  tweaking
Take	  Off Take	  Off
13 Measure/Project	  Vehicle	  Conditions Determine	  from	  onboard	  sensors	  status	  of	  air	  
vehilce	  subsystems
14 Predict	  On	  Mission	  Fuel	  Usage Determine	  based	  on	  take-­‐off	  factors	  what	  the	  
fuel	  usage	  will	  be	  upon	  entering	  the	  mission	  
area
15 Current	  Flight	  Route	  Evaluation Determine	  if	  planned	  route	  is	  still	  
feasible/appropriate
16 Alternative	  Flight	  Route	  Evaluation Where	  desired/required,	  detemine,	  review	  
performance	  on	  an	  alternate	  route,	  as	  a	  
means	  for	  comparison	  to	  baseline	  route
17 Margin	  Calculation
18 Fuel	  Status	  Determination Calculate/determine	  fuel	  state/availability
19 Fuel	  Prediction Predict	  if	  fuel	  is	  still	  adequate	  for	  mission	  
accomplishment
20 Take	  Off	  Abort	  Decision	  Execution Make	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  aboard	  the	  
missionMission	  
Execution Flight	  Route	  Assessment
21 assess	  planned	  flight	  route/determine	  sensitivities Upon	  mission	  area	  entry,	  reassess	  flight	  route	  
plan	  and	  how	  immediate	  environment,	  
mission	  situation	  affects	  the	  planned	  mission	  
approach	  (route,	  sensor	  plan)
22 resolve	  flight	  route	  conflicts resolve	  any	  conflicts	  on	  route	  by	  
recommending	  alternate,	  appropriate	  
route/plan
23 modify	  on	  mission	  objectives	  or	  rtn	  to	  base determine	  if/how	  to	  modify	  mission	  
objectives,	  or	  return	  to	  base
ISR	  Mission	  Assessment
24 Review	  initial	  sensing	  objectives	  and	  constraints Plot,	  assess	  sensing	  objectives	  and	  determine	  
constraints
25 Obtain	  sensor	  and	  sensing	  status Retrieve	  sensor	  configuration,	  status,	  
capabilities	  
26 resolve	  sensing	  &	  route	  conflicts Re-­‐evaluate	  route	  based	  on	  sensor	  
configuration	  and	  capabilities
27 	  integrated	  plan	  assessment Assess	  integrated	  sensor/route	  plan
28 recommend	  modifications	  to	  mission	  objectives recommend	  modifications	  to	  the	  plan	  based	  
on	  mission	  performance,	  integrated	  plan	  
information.	  	  Make	  updates	  to	  flight/mission	  
plan.
Landing Landing/Recovery	  Opportunities	  Evaluator
29 Landing	  Abort	  Information Retrive	  information	  to	  assist	  with	  decision	  on	  
aborting	  the	  mission	  and	  landing	  safely
30 Landing	  Site	  Validation re-­‐validate	  planned	  landing	  is	  still	  good.
Contingencies
31 Pullout	  Calc	  &	  Assessment Upon	  exiting	  mission	  area,	  determine	  what	  
32 Landing/Recovery	  Update	  Monitoring	  (of	  systems) Determine	  ability	  to	  land	  safely-­‐	  provide	  
margin	  (fuel,	  etc)
33 Landing	  Location	  Recomputation Recompute/revalidate	  landing	  location	  still	  
valid
34 Landing	  Action	  (or	  wave	  off,	  come	  back) Determine	  pull	  out	  threshold	  and	  assess	  
ability	  to	  recover
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B. ASSESSING UAS FUNCTIONS USING THE FLOAAT 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Having determined and categorized the list of functions that should be 
evaluated, the next step is to answer the set of 35 questions, for each and every 
function, that get at the heart of trust and cost/benefit. Full examples that show 
comments to the questions posed for Weather and Mission Objective 
Assessment are provided in Appendix C. The two functions differ in that one 
scored high for autonomous management of that function (weather data retrieval 
and assessment), and the other scored lower (mission optimization decision). 
Answering the questionnaire took at least thirty minutes per function. The 
questions forced contemplation of the function, its design aspects, complexity, 
and, depending on the function, elicited a response that at times was informed by 
emotion as well as rationality. For example, the “Weather, Environmental Data 
and Information” function appears simple on the surface. Every mission requires 
weather data to plan before takeoff and requires near real time weather 
surrounding the aircraft during the mission to maintain safe flight. Table 8 below 
shows the question comments and notes for this function. In general, the 
Question Notes column was not altered from the NASA questionnaire, as it 
provided needed context and amplification of the question posed in the column to 
the left of the scores. However, comments were provided for nearly each 
response to explain the score provided. 
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Table 8.   Questions from the FLOAAT Questionnaire and Comments 
to Those Questions for the Weather and Environmental Data 
Function (adapted from Proud and Hart, 2005) 
 
 
Scoring for each function is straight forward. The number of marks is 
tallied for each rating level, and then averaged using equal weighting. For the 
Weather function, this resulted in a score of 5.63 (shown in Table 9 below) for 
Trust and 6.14 for Cost/Benefit.  Table 9 is not directly from Proud and Hart’s 
work, as it is composed of adapted input and applies to a UAS as opposed to a 
space craft.   The FLOAAT example published and represented in Appendix B 
does not have a weather function. 
  
LoA	  Scale 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Question	  notes Comments/Notes	  to	  
Ability
What	  is	  the	  expected	  ability	  of	  
developers	  to	  correctly	  design	  the	  
function	  for	  all	  possibilities	  within	  
the	  design	  phase	  deadlines?
1 Expected	  ability	  of	  designers	  
to	  completely	  define	  the	  world	  
of	  possibilities	  that	  this	  
function	  will	  face,	  before	  the	  
final	  deadline.	  Ability	  is	  
defined	  as	  able	  to	  do	  the	  job,	  
not	  the	  designer's	  ability	  level.
What	  is	  the	  expected	  ability	  of	  
programmers	  to	  correctly	  
implement	  the	  design	  within	  the	  
implementation	  deadlines?
1 Expected	  ability	  of	  software	  
writers	  to	  completely	  code	  the	  
design	  that	  the	  developers	  
handed	  them,	  regardless	  of	  
the	  size	  of	  the	  world	  that	  was	  
defined	  in	  the	  design	  phase,	  
before	  the	  final	  deadline.	  
Ability	  is	  defined	  as	  able
to	  do	  the	  job,	  not	  the	  
programmer's	  ability	  level.
weather	  data	  is	  available	  
and	  easily	  fed	  into	  
systems.	  	  Flight	  models	  
can	  adjust	  to	  the	  weather	  
elements	  but	  some	  
information	  is	  not	  
detailed	  enough	  to	  
provide	  a	  true	  projection	  
of	  what	  the	  weather	  
situation	  will	  be.	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Table 9.   Weather Function (from Proud and Hart, 2005) 
 
 
The Trust Score is lower than the Cost/Benefit Score.  What this means is 
that there is a cost benefit to automating the function, but trust issues prevent a 
higher level of autonomy from being applied. The difference between the two 
scores is not great; both fall into the category that human-operator consent is still 
desired before auctioning this function. But, this research has shown that the 
details should be retained. The act of going through the thought process is what 
is significant. The comments and notes annotated along the way can serve as 
design artifacts for reference when the process of lower level design activities 
commence. 
C. REVIEWING THE RESULTS IN SUMMARY 
The answers to the 35 questions result in a composite score for Trust and 
a composite score for Cost that are shown in the Level of Autonomy (LoA) Trust 
Limit and LoA Cost Limit in the right most columns of Table 10. One step that is 
enforced in the overall process is the comparison of Trust to Cost/Benefit of 
automating that function. There is a clear difference between how much a human 
user trusts for a certain function to be handled by an autonomous system and 
how high the cost is to implement it. If the human-operator does not trust the 
Function	  Name Scale	  Type	  (Ob,	  Or,	  D,	  or	  A)
Observe
Weather,	  Environment	  Data	  and	  Information
Question	  -­‐-­‐>	  Answer	  1	  in	  most	  applicable	  
column
1 LOA	  Trust	  Limit
LoA	  Scale 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 1 2 2 5 5 2 1 1 0
Weights 0 0.053 0.105 0.105 0.263 0.263 0.105 0.053 0.053 0
Absolute	  Scores 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 LOA	  Cost/Benefit	  	  Limit
0 1 2 3 4 2 0 2 0 0
Weights 0 0.071 0.143 0.214 0.286 0.143 0 0.143 0 0
Absolute	  Scores 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Score 5.63
Ave 6.14
High	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Low
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system, then it does not matter how intelligent or cost-efficient the system is 
designed to be. Similarly, even though a system would be highly trusted to work 
fully autonomously, there is no guarantee that this is the most cost-effective 
method of performing the function. A specific example is automated mission 
(flight route) validation for an unmanned air system. At present, a human 
operator performing the function is actually quicker and, therefore, more cost 
effective, than automating the function (Absil 2014). Given this premise, the 




Table 10.   Level of Autonomy Scores for UAS Functions 
(after Proud and Hard 2005) 
 
 
Scores range from the low 4s to just over 7 on a scale from one to ten. 
This range of scores generally equates to levels of automation where the system 
does heaving lifting but still requires consent or confirmation from the human-
operator. Recall that in Chapter III it was noted that the scale depicts high, 










Pre-­‐Planning Mission	  Plan	  Provisioning
Mission	  Objectives
1 Objective	  Function	  Selection 4.34 5.58 4.34
2 Nominal	  Take-­‐Off,	  Cruise	  to	  Mission	  Area	  Flight	  Constraints 5.80 4.90 4.90
3 Flight	  Route	  Optimization	  Analysis	  (Against	  Sensing	  Objectives) 5.78 5.98 5.78
Route	  Planning
4 Weather,	  Environment	  Data	  and	  Information 5.63 6.14 5.63
5 Vehicle/Flight	  Model	  Interpretation	  &	  Check 5.05 5.50 5.05
6 Predict	  Take	  Off-­‐On	  Mission	  Performance	  Margin 6.05 6.50 6.05
7 Sensor	  System	  Evaluation 7.12 7.56 7.12
8 Flight	  Route	  Performance	  and	  Constraint	  Evaluation 5.57 5.71 5.57
9 Evaluate	  Mission	  Area	  Coverage 5.10 5.90 5.10
10 Evaluate	  Flight	  Abort	  Coverage	  and	  Contingencies 4.89 5.93 4.89
11 Route	  Optimization	  Decision 4.79 5.79 4.79
12 Mission/Flight	  Route	  Generation	  -­‐	  Accept/Reject 4.33 5.21 4.33
Take	  Off Take	  Off
13 Measure/Project	  Vehicle	  Conditions 6.23 5.98 5.98
14 Predict	  On	  Mission	  Fuel	  Usage 6.12 5.85 5.85
15 Current	  Flight	  Route	  Evaluation 5.34 5.58 5.34
16 Alternative	  Flight	  Route	  Evaluation 5.38 5.85 5.38
17 Margin	  Calculation 6.11 5.98 5.98
18 Fuel	  Status	  Determination 7.62 7.88 7.62
19 Fuel	  Prediction 6.11 6.02 6.02




21 assess	  planned	  flight	  route/determine	  sensitivities 5.23 5.11 5.11
22 resolve	  flight	  route	  conflicts 4.42 4.97 4.42
23 modify	  on	  mission	  objectives	  or	  rtn	  to	  base 4.14 4.87 4.14
ISR	  Mission	  Assessment 0.00
24 Review	  initial	  sensing	  objectives	  and	  constraints 5.43 5.55 5.43
25 Obtain	  sensor	  and	  sensing	  status 6.90 6.53 6.53
26 resolve	  sensing	  &	  route	  conflicts 5.85 5.47 5.47
27 	  integrated	  plan	  assessment 5.12 5.42 5.12
28 recommend	  modifications	  to	  mission	  objectives	  to	  VMS 5.34 5.12 5.12
Landing Landing/Recovery	  Opportunities	  Evaluator
29 Landing	  Abort	  Information 5.99 6.12 5.99
30 Landing	  Site	  Selection/Validation 4.77 5.23 4.77
Contingencies
31 Pullout	  Calc	  &	  Assessment 5.28 5.55 5.28
32 Landing/Recovery	  Update	  Monitoring	  (of	  systems) 5.53 6.53 5.53
33 LandingLocation	  Recomputation 5.38 5.47 5.38
34 Landing	  Action	  (or	  wave	  off,	  come	  back) 4.12 5.12 4.12
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medium, and low autonomy levels. These three tiers generally equate to manual, 
autonomous with consent, and fully autonomous control (high). Table 11 below 
depicts these tiers and the general descriptions of autonomous behavior 
exhibited by the UAS. 
Table 11.   Summary Levels of Supervisory Control for Adjustable 
Autonomy (from Sheridan 1992 and Parasuraman 2000) 
 
 
What the scores indicate is that the human-operator still needs to and 
should be ready to engage at the appropriate time during a mission. When one 
examines the scores along with the OODA groupings, an interesting pattern is 
revealed. Those functions that fall into the Decide and Act categories tend to 
score slightly lower in the autonomy level. What this implies is that a higher level 
of control should be provided to the human-operator for these functions, likely 
because these functions involve a level of decision-making where the human-
operator needs to remain “in-the-loop.” This observation is not yet decisive; 
additional exploration and research is required to determine if the observation is 
statistically significant. But, it is one to list for future research. 
























UAS	  observes	  and	  monitors	  all	  systems	  and	  commands	  and	  
acts	  autonomously,	  informing	  the	  human	  operator	  after	  the	  
fact,	  displaying	  information	  only	  if	  asked.	  	  	  ignoring	  the	  
human
The	  UAS	  gathers,	  filters,	  and	  prioritizes	  information	  displayed	  
to	  the	  human,	  in	  time	  for	  human-­‐operator	  to	  provide	  consent	  
or	  to	  intervene.
The	  UAS	  is	  responsible	  for	  gathering	  and	  displaying	  
unfiltered,	  unprioritized	  information	  for	  the	  human.	  The	  
human	  still	  is	  the	  prime	  monitor	  for	  all	  informatio,	  
responsible	  for	  filtering,	  prioritizing,	  and	  assessing	  the	  data).
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D. SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In summary, FLOAAT proved to be an effective tool to get at the heart of 
what level of autonomy is appropriate for any one function. The approach forced 
thoughtful consideration of different design, employment and cost aspects of 
making a function autonomous, which, in a manner, forced thorough 
requirements analysis for that function. Employment of FLOAAT showed that the 
process for determining the Level of Autonomy for any one function is iterative; a 
subject matter expert, in working through the questions and rating level 
definitions wrestles with the derived level resulting from the tool, and ostensibly 
would negotiate the intent and meaning of this level with a broader systems 
design team.  
Another reason FLOAAT is beneficial is that using the tool prevents an 
operator or subject matter expert from gaming the system. What is meant by this 
is that one cannot look at a function and its definition and assign, subjectively, 
what the rating level should be. The level is derived from answering the set of 35 
questions, which results in a composite score.  
The fact that FLOAAT enables systems designers to understand the level 
of autonomy to design into a system so as to engender and retain trust, provides 
the foundation in which a human-operator is better positioned to operate a 
system effectively. Using the framework provided by Vaneman and Triantis on 
architectural attributes for resilient systems, it provides a mechanism to define a 
loose-coupling between the human-operator’s control needs and a system’s 
ability to execute autonomously. It provides a means to define and design in 
various levels of autonomy that can be changed and altered by the human-
operator when required. In this way, it provides “procedural flexibility,” thereby 
designing in a means to adapt the system’s operations when needed. It positions 
that operator to leverage their knowledge, intuition and experience to be able to 
act or react to unanticipated events, thereby improving the resilience of a system.  
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Though the tool has proven useful in initial research, further investigation 
is required to truly validate its employment in the UAS domain. NASA has applied 
this to several programs. In doing so, they have developed approaches to 
validate the level of autonomy as suggested by FLOAAT (Proud and Hart 2005). 
They have a baseline of experience to draw from. This is not the case for 
unmanned aerial systems. If this tool were to be more widely adopted, there is 
more work to be done: 
1. Determination of the composition of the team who should 
participate in the process of defining the level of autonomy by 
answering the questionnaire. How many and of why type of subject 
matter experts should be included?  
2. The Level of Autonomy tool employed and adapted was originally 
designed to ascertain the division of labor between the computer 
and the human-operator (Proud and Hart 2005). Additional 
questions could be added to determine the division of labor 
between what should be on the aircraft and what functions should 
be executed in the mission control system.  
3. The questions should be refined and tested against a larger cross-
section of users or subject matter experts to ensure the question is 
clear and the intent is communicated.  
4. Test cases should be developed in order to more quickly validate 
the scores and even prototype the output. 
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V. FLOAAT APPLICABILITY ASSESSMENT AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Adjustable Autonomy improves a system’s ability to adapt. It does so by 
providing a level of autonomy along a continuum that can be dialed up or down in 
terms of level of automation. This directly allows the system to adapt to 
unanticipated obstacles or unforeseen events by leveraging the higher order 
cognition of the human-operator. The challenge, at times has been, how much 
autonomy to design into a system’s certain functions. This research 
contemplates the levels of autonomy that can be designed in for adjustment so 
as to improve the resilience of a system. Properly defined levels of autonomy 
directly addresses the trust issues of a human-operator, and optimizes the 
performance of the human and performance of the autonomous system. 
Regardless of how much autonomy is implemented in a system, some level of 
human-operator involvement will be required in interacting with that system (Glas 
and Kanda 2012). This is the case even if the only task the human-operator has 
is to monitor the system, just in case he/she needs to terminate a certain 
operation. That the level of autonomy can be adjusted is important. For the 
application to the unmanned aerial system on an ISR mission, this could be true 
when the human-operator gets busy handling or acknowledging sensing aspects 
of the mission and needs to leave flight handling completely to the system to take 
care of. Perhaps, the mission is long and boring. In this case, most functions can 
be set at fully autonomous, with the feature that the system alerts the human if it 
senses the mission, the environment, its operations require attention. Given this 
premise, the human-system roles and interface should be defined and designed 
so that the human-operator is able to graduate to more autonomous operation as 
the trust level increases. 
A. EVALUATION OF ADAPTING FLOAAT TO A UAS 
Having adapted and then applied NASA’s FLOAAT to a set of UAS 
functions, the following points can be made: 
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1. The FLOAAT Questionnaire 
As had been mentioned, the wording of the questions should be further 
tested against a broader group of relevant subject matter experts who have 
different roles and, therefore, different views. An attempt was made to get 
additional personnel to answer the questions, but the time this would require was 
too extensive. To properly fill out the questionnaire for a function took at least 30 
minutes; 34 questions would require at least 15 hours per person. Due to 
resource and time limitations, this bank of questions was answered by only one 
person. This person, the author, has nearly ten years of experience working on 
fielded and unfielded unmanned aerial systems; still, the answers are from only 
one person, from one perspective. 
Due to the subjective nature of determining the appropriate level of 
autonomy in designing a system, personal biases and technical experiences 
could affect the results. The questions are interpreted differently from person to 
person. The wording of subjective questions, corresponding notes, and examples 
in this tool is critical, especially if the question refers to a length of time or 
milestone (which must be explicitly stated). 
Besides testing the wording of the questions further, the size and 
composition of the group of respondents needs to be determined. How many 
need to answer to ensure relevance? What backgrounds should be sought out? 
Obviously, the more that answers the questions, the better. But, such an 
approach could become costly. At the very least, respondents need to be from 
groups who have true input and impact on the system. NASA had sought out a 
low number, trusting subject matter expertise and engineering judgment, but they 
did seek out various backgrounds–flight controllers, trainer, ground control 
operators, systems engineers (Proud and Hart 2005). 
Finally, what should not be lost when examining scores provided to any 
one function are the comments that are provided along with the numerical score. 
The questionnaire provided an additional column for users to provide comments 
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and amplification for their scores. Oftentimes the comments provided the 
underpinning for the answer on how their score aligned with the OODA 
framework, or how they may have interpreted the question when applied to the 
function at hand. Other times comments suggested design approaches that 
addressed architectural attributes, like how to design in adaptability to a certain 
function. 
2. Employment of OODA Categories 
Contemplating the process of using the FLOAAT process in defining a 
level of autonomy brings up the question of whether or not bucketing each 
function in the OODA decision categories was useful or not. On face value, the 
process seemed to be an extra step that took time and the definitions for each 
category does not seem to be that different. However, when contemplating a 
single function, the framework does become useful. It forces a thought process 
that helps further identify the level of autonomy the person answering the 
question is comfortable with, or is certain of, and provides a means of referencing 
that level to a scale. NASA had created these categories and differentiated the 
rating levels; a level 5 in Observe is not the same as a level 5 in Orient, Decide 
or Act. Their work has created a foundation that has solidified these definitions. 
For this tool to be truly useful, the same needs to be done for the UAS 
community. However, even if this step were not taken, in the end, the OODA 
framework proved useful. Ultimately, it served as a validation check on whether 
or not the resulting score for any one function made sense. 
3. Employment of the 10-Level Rating Scale 
As had been pointed out in preceding Chapters, despite the existence of 
several levels of 10-level rating scales, autonomy levels can generally be 
bucketed into three tiers: fully autonomous, autonomous with consent, and 
manual. Therefore, there arises the question on whether or not a 10-level scale is 
necessary or that a 3-level rating scale is sufficient? Would not a simpler scale 
reduce complexity and be easier to employ? Based on the experience of going 
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through the process of using the 10-level rating scale, the answer is that for 
designers and for subject matter experts answering the questions, the granularity 
is helpful. Though the output from this research has not been employed in 
actually implementing a level of autonomy using this system, which would 
validate some of the statements made in this conclusion, the detailed levels have 
already assisted with requirements analysis and definition. Potentially, the 
conclusion should be that this tool should be employed by systems engineers to 
obtain the Voice of the Customer in order to further refine system level 
requirements in order to develop and interface that is suitable and trusted by the 
human-operator. 
4. Incorporation of Architecting for Resilience 
The questionnaire, in many respects, helps a systems engineer/designer 
wrestle with the intent of a systems level requirement. In this way, it facilitates 
requirements analysis. There is an opportunity to insert questions or modify 
questions to ensure certain architecting principles are included, such as those 
which would ensure consideration of resilience principles–loose coupling, means 
to enhance robustness, functional and physical redundancy, etc. This was done 
in a modest fashion in this research and could be extended more broadly. Some 
of the questions inherently got at systems robustness. 
B. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a key aspect that should be kept in mind and explored as the 
military and operators get more accustomed to unmanned systems and 
increased levels of autonomy. Experience shows that human operators have a 
tendency to become reliant on the automated/autonomous systems. This can be 
particularly challenging during system degradation, sometimes without the full 
awareness of the human-operator. Overreliance on automation is frequently 
suspected as a factor in or indeed the cause of aviation incidents and accidents. 
Overreliance and loss of operator proficiency can result in human-operators 
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becoming reluctant to assume manual control even when the autonomous 
system is not operating correctly. (National Research Council 2014). 
Autonomous systems have been changing the way the military does 
business, and, with recent investment by the DOD and the commercial world, is 
on the threshold of exerting deep changes in military operations. These systems 
can and will be able to be operated without direct human control for extended 
periods of time and over long distances. This is beneficial and will open the field 
for more applications while reducing costs; but, it should be done with the 
human-operator, and his/her strengths and weaknesses, in mind. Or else, the 
systems may not be adopted, or, even worse, the systems may not be safe. As 
such, the following are a few suggested areas of further research: 
1. Human-Operator Collaboration 
• Determine how the roles of human-operations and the autonomous 
systems, as well as the human-system interface, should evolve to 
enhance more efficient yet safe operations. 
• Further understanding of human psychology in the operation of 
autonomous systems. 
• Interfaces, be they visual, aural, focused on assistance or alerting 
to problems that improve human performance. 
• Approaches to adjust to different skill and cognition levels in 
human-operators, with an eye toward safety. 
2. Verification, Validation, and Certification 
• Develop standards and processes for the verification, validation, 
and certification of autonomous systems, and determine their 
implications for architecture and design. 
3. Autonomy Architecture 
• Explore and define the landscape of autonomous systems 
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APPENDIX A. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY QUESTIONNAIRE 




Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
  Observe     
  Function X     
  Question --> Answer 
1 in most applicable 
column     
1 LOA Trust 
Questions     






What is the expected 
ability of developers to 
correctly design the 
function for all 
possibilities within the 
design phase 
deadlines? 
Expected ability of 
designers to completely 
define the world of 
possibilities that this 
function will face, 
before the final 
deadline. Ability is 
defined as able to do 
the job, not the 
designer's ability level. 
  
  
What is the expected 
ability of programmers 
to correctly implement 
the design within the 
implementation 
deadlines? 
Expected ability of 
software writers to 
completely code the 
design that the 
developers handed 
them, regardless of the 
size of the world that 
was defined in the 
design phase, before 
the final deadline. 
Ability is defined as 
able 







Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
Difficulty 
What is the expected 
effort of developers to 
correctly design the 
function for all 
possibilities within the 
design phase 
deadlines? 
This is the same as the 
above questions, but 
the focus is not on "how 
good will the design 
be?' but on "how hard 
will it be to design?" 
  
  
What is the expected 
effort of programmers 
to correctly implement 
the design within the 
implementation 
deadlines? 
Focus is "how hard" - 
the coding of the 
selection function is 
straightforward; the 
development of math 
models, or 
characterization of what 




What is the likelihood 







How well will/can the 
function be designed 
to manage "outside-
the-box" scenarios? 
Should be able to 
design the model; this 





(what level) has the 
function been shown 
to perform? 
Commercial and 
military systems have 
this function more or 






Has the function been 
completed solely by a 
human during the 
flight phase itself? 
This is a pre-mission 
function; humans may 
have acted to change 
the objective, and try 
and optimize, but likely 
was based on 





of a mental model of 
the function can a 
human create, 
including how the 
Are the concepts, 
themselves, involved 






Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
function works, what 
the output means, 
how to interact with 
the function? 
  
What is the level of 
human understanding 
required to accurately 
decide when an 
override is 
necessary? 
What level of 
understanding would a 
human need to have in 
order to determine if the 
output from this function 
is out of family? It would 
be high. Humans tend 




If an override is 
performed, what is the 
ability of a human to 
come up with a 
solution themselves? 
Human will come up 
with solution, but may 
not be mathematically 
optimal 
  
Art vs Science 
How much would a 
human have to infer 
what the computer 
"really meant" or what 
the computer will do in 
the future? 
This is truly an Art vs. 
Science question. If 
performing this function 
is an art form of human 
fudge factors, and post-
processing mental 
tweaks, then it should 
be hard to automate. 
Though if the function is 
purely scientific, with a 
definite answer that 
needs little human 
interaction to change it 
to be the "correct" 
answer, then the 
function should be 
easier to automate. 
  
Familiarity 
How familiar, friendly, 
and natural will the 
output feel to the 
user? 




potential answers could 
be provided visually for 
each objective function 





Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
can leverage 
experience to make a 
decision. 
Correctness 
What is the probability 
that the 
computer could come 
up with an answer 
that is "more 
accurate" than a 
human? 
Both a human and a 
computer can come up 
with an answer that is 
"right". A human may 
be able take the big 
picture and incorporate 
it into coming up with 
the better answer. A 
computer may be able 
to run optimization 
algorithms to come up 
with a better answer. 




How much training 
would be required for 
a human to perform 




Training would revolve 
around what the 
objective functions 
provided; what they 
mean to the mission 
  
  
How much training 
would be required for 
a human to interface 
with a tool using this 
function based on 
current understanding 
of the implementation 
of this function? 
Can a human do this 
task with some help 
from the computer? 
  
  
How much verification 
would be required for 
this function to be 
trusted to perform fully 
autonomously? 
how many cases and 
examples would have 
to be proven to work 
correctly for the function 






Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
Override 
Is an override 
capability required 
(yes or no)? 
There may need to be 
with novice users who 
do not understand 
selection of a math 
model; This will limit the 
autonomy scale to allow 




How deterministic is 
the output from this 
function? 
Flight constraints etc. 
tend to be fairly specific 
once flight model 
characterized 
  
        
Weights       
Absolute 
Scores 
      
        
2 LOA Cost/Benefit 
Questions 
    
Usefulness How critical is this 
function to an 
overall Autonomous 
Mission and Flight 
Management system? 
While the function itself 
might not be that 
critical, other functions 
might require this 
function to be done 
highly autonomously in 




  How useful would 
automating this 
function be? 
Gut feeling. This 
function would be 
useful for the computer 
to do instead of the 
human. 
  
Time How much time is 






Each flight phase has a 
different scale of time. 
On Take Off and 
Landing phase, many 
decisions may be 
required in 
milliseconds. This is 
faster than a human 
could possibly provide 





Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
towards more 
autonomy. 
Criticality What is the criticality 
of this function to 
vehicle safety? 
function would impact 
how vehicle would fly 
  
  What is the criticality 
of this function to crew 
safety? 
System is unmanned; 
mission control needs 
to be protected, but 
there is no harm to 
crew as there is not a 
crew in the vehicle 
  
Costs How many lines of 
code are expected? 
low <= 1000 
med-low <= 10,000 
med <= 50,000 
med-high <= 100,000 
high >100,000 
Arbitrary scale based 
on a few conversations 




  ** How much time to 
design the function is 
expected? 
Question of man-hours. 
The deadline for 
completion is set, and 
this question asks will 




How much time to 
implement the 
software for this 
function is expected? 
Same as previous 
question. Focused on 




What is the level of 
required verification 
and validation? 
This is the software 
V&V question. How 
many runs will be 
needed to prove that 
the algorithms work. 
  
  
** What is the 
required skill level of 
software writers? 
How hard will the 




To what degree would 
automating this 
function increase the 
Would this increase the 
efficiency of whoever 





Scale Type (Ob, Or, 
D, or A)     
efficiency of a 
human? 




To what degree would 
automating this 
function decrease a 
human's mental 
workload? 
Would the human still 
have to worry about this 
function? Could this be 
automated well-enough 
that the human does 




How repetitious is the 
function (level of 
frequency)? 
Answer based on the 
flight phase, and the 
number of cycles a 
second the function 
would be performed. 
  
  
How mundane (does 
not utilize the skills of 
the operator) is the 
function? 
Depends on the 
operator to some 
extent. But, if the task 
bores the human that is 
forced to perform it, the 
tendency is for errors to 
increase. Thus, 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 59 
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE OF NASA’S LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 
SCORES FOR A SPACECRAFT 
Table 13.   NASA’s FLOAAT Scores for a Spacecraft Re-planning tool  
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